We extend the notion of \only knowing" introduced by Halpern and Moses 11] to many agents and to a number of modal logics. In this approach, \all an agent knows is " is true in a structure M if, in M, the agent knows and has a maximum set of \possibilities". To extend this approach, we need to make precise what counts as a \possibility". In the single-agent case, we can identify a possibility with a truth assignment. In the multi-agent case, things are more complicated. We consider three notions of possibility (all related). We argue that the rst is most appropriate for non-introspective logics, such as Kn, Tn, and S4n, the second is most appropriate for K45n and KD45n, and the last is most appropriate for S5n. With the appropriate notion of possibility, we show that are reasonable extensions in all cases.
Introduction
Halpern and Moses 11] introduced a notion of \only knowing", in an e ort to characterize the state of an agent that has been told only a nite number of facts. Suppose that is the conjunction of what the agent has been told. What else does an agent who has been told only know? It is not just the logical consequences of . For example, if is the primitive proposition p, then the agent does not know q, where q is some other primitive proposition. But if the agent is introspective, then the agent knows that he does not know q.
Halpern and Moses give a number of (provably equivalent) characterizations of what it means for an agent to \only know ", assuming that there is only one agent in the system, and that agent's knowledge is characterized by the modal logic S5. The latter means that the agent does not know false facts, and that the agent has complete introspective power regarding his own knowledge.
As pointed out by Halpern and Moses, extending the de nitions of \only knowing" to the multi-agent case is quite subtle. They sketched arguments showing why none of the obvious ways of extending the de nitions used in the single-agent case would give reasonable answers in the multi-agent case. In this paper, we show how the de nitions can be generalized to the multi-agent case. Moreover, we extend the de nitions to other logics besides S5.
To make the notion of \knowing only " precise, we need to consider the Kripke structure where the agent knows and has a maximum set of \possibilities". While the notion of \possibility" is straightforward in the single-agent case|it can be identi ed with a truth assignment|it becomes more subtle once we have many agents in the picture. Indeed, we argue that the right notion depends on the logic we are considering. We use three di erent notion of \possibility": one for K, T, and S4, one for K45 and KD45, and one for S5. The reasons we do this highlight the di erences between logics with negative introspection and those without, and the added complexities involved with S5, which has both negative introspection and the veridicality property: only true things are known.
Our results also shed light on the single-agent S5 case. For example, it was always viewed as signi cant that the HM (Halpern-Moses) notion of only knowing was based on S5, while a di erent notion of only knowing considered by Levesque 19] is based on K45. In fact, our results show that the HM notion is better understood in the context of K45. Indeed, in the single-agent case, the HM notion remains unchanged if we use K45 (or KD45) instead of S5. However, in the multi-agent case, there are signi cant di erences between K45 and S5. Moreover, as we show here, all the results proved by Halpern and Moses for the single-agent case extend more naturally to the multi-agent case for K45 and KD45 than they do for S5.
The key technical tool we use to de ne our notions of possibility, the !-tree, is closely related to the tools used in a number of other papers that have attempted to de ne HM-like notions of only knowing for many agents: the knowledge structures de ned by Fagin, Halpern, and Vardi 4] , which were also used by Vardi 24] , the normal models de ned by Parikh 21] , and the use of amalgamation by Jaspars 15] . As we shall see, our approach seems to allow for much more e cient decision procedures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a brief review of the relevant details of modal logic. In Section 3, we discuss general issues
We give semantics to all these logics by using Kripke structures. A Kripke structure is a tuple (W; ; K 1 ; : : :; K n ), where W is a set of worlds, associates with each world a truth assignment to the primitive propositions, so that (w)(p) 2 ftrue; falseg for each world w and primitive proposition p, and K 1 ; : : :; K n are binary accessibility relations. We use the notation K M i when we want to refer to the K i relation in the structure M; similarly, we use W M and M . We omit the superscript M if it is clear from context. We de ne K i (w) to be fw 0 : (w; w 0 ) 2 K i g. Thus, K i (w)
is the set of worlds agent i considers possible in world w.
Recall that a binary relation K on W is re exive if (w; w) 2 K for all w 2 W, transitive if (u; v) 2 K and (v; w) 2 K implies (u; w) 2 K, Euclidean if (u; v) 2 K and (u; w) 2 K implies (v; w) 2 K, and serial if for all w 2 W, there is some w 0 such that (w; w 0 ) 2 K. Let M be the class of all Kripke structures. We restrict M by using superscripts r, s, t, and e, to denote re exive, serial, transitive, and Euclidean structures, respectively. Thus, M rt denotes the class of all structures where the K i relations are re exive and transitive knowledge, M est denotes the class of all structures where the K i relations are Euclidean, serial, and transitive, and so on.
A situation is a pair (M; w) consisting of a Kripke structure and a world w in M. We give semantics to formulas with respect to situations. If p is a primitive It is well known that there is a close connection between conditions placed on K and the axioms. In particular, T corresponds to the K i s being re exive, 4 to the K i s being transitive, 5 to the K i s being Euclidean, and D to the K i s being serial. Thus, we get the following result (see 2, 12] for proofs):
Theorem 1 K n (resp. T n , S4 n , KD45 n , K45 n , S5 n ) is a sound and complete axiomatization for the language L n with respect to M (resp., M r , M rt , M est , M et , M ret ). 2 An S situation (for S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n ; K45 n ; KD45 n ; S5 n g) is a situation (M; w)
where M satis es the appropriate restriction; thus, for example, (M; w) is a S4 n situation if M 2 M rt . We write j = S ' if the formula ' is true in all S situations. By Theorem 1, for a formula ' 2 L n , we have j = S ' i ' is provable in S.
It is well known (again, see 2], 13], or 12] ) that in the single-agent case of KD45 n , K45 n , and S5 n , we can consider a simpler class of structures. We de ne a K45 situation to be a pair (W; w), where W is a set of truth assignments that, intuitively, characterize the worlds the agent considers possible, and w is a truth assignment that, intuitively, characterizes the \real world". A KD45 situation is a 2 The more common characterizationis that S5n is sound and complete with respect to the class of structures where the K i s are equivalence relations. However, as observed in 12], K is an equivalence relation i K is re exive, Euclidean, and transitive. Thus, M ret in fact consists of precisely those structures where the K i s are equivalence relations. Moreover, it is easy to see that re exive and Euclidean relations must be transitive, so that M re is identical to M ret . K45 situation (W; w) such that W 6 = ;. An S5 situation (W; w) is a K45 situation such that w 2 W.
We again give semantics to formulas with respect to situations. If p is a primitive proposition, then (W; w) j = p if p is true under truth assignment w. Conjunctions and negations are dealt with in the standard way. Finally, (W; w) j = K i (W; w 0 ) j = for all w 0 2 W: 3 It is well known 13] that a formula is provable in K45 (resp. KD45, S5) if and only if it is true in all K45 (resp. KD45, S5) situations.
\Only knowing" in the multi-agent case
The intuition behind the HM notion of \all I know" in the single-agent case is straightforward: In each world of a (Kripke) structure, an agent considers a number of other worlds possible. In the case of a single agent whose knowledge satis es S5 (or K45 or KD45), as we observed in Section 2, we can identify a world with a truth assignment, and a structure with a set of truth assignments. The more worlds an agent considers possible, the less he knows. We take (W; w) to be a situation where is all that is known if (1) (W; w) j = K (so that the agent knows ) and (2) if (W 0 ; w 0 ) j = K , then W 0 W. If there is no situation (W; w) satisfying (1) and (2) , then is said to be dishonest; intuitively, it cannot then be the case that \all the agent knows" is .
A typical dishonest formula is Kp _ Kq. To see that this formula is dishonest, let W p consist of all truth assignments satisfying p, let W q consist of all truth assignments satisfying q, and let w satisfy p^q. Then (W p ; w) j = Kp_Kq, and (W q ; w) j = Kp_Kq. Thus, if Kp _ Kq were honest, there would have to be a situation (W; w 0 ) such that (W; w 0 ) j = Kp_Kq and W W p W q . It is easy to see that no such situation exists.
Notice that in the case of one agent, it does not matter if we consider S5, KD45, or K45 when speaking of honesty. If a formula that is not equivalent to false is honest with respect to one of these logics, then it is honest with respect to the other two. 4 We want to extend this intuition to the multi-agent case and|in order to put these ideas into better perspective|to other modal logics. There are philosophical problems involved in dealing with a notion of \all I know" for the non-introspective logics. What does it mean for an agent to say \all I know is " if he cannot do negative introspection, and so does not know what he doesn't know? Fortunately, there is another interpretation of this approach that makes sense for arbitrary modal logics. Suppose that a says to b, \All c knows is " (where c is di erent from a and b).
If b knows in addition that c's reasoning satis es the axioms of modal logic S, then it seems reasonable for b to say that c's knowledge is described by the \minimal" model satisfying the axioms of S consistent with K c , and for b to view a as dishonest if there is no such minimal model. This suggests that making sense of \all I know" (or \all agent i knows") reduces to de ning what it means for a model to be \minimal". Once we consider multiagent logics, or even nonintrospective single-agent logics, we can no longer identify a possible world with a truth assignment. It is not just the truth assignment at a world that matters; we also need to consider what other worlds are accessible from that world. This makes it more di cult to de ne a reasonable notion of minimality. To deal with this problem, we de ne a canonical collection of \possibilities", i.e., objects that an agent can consider possible. These will act like the possible truth assignments in the single-agent case.
What properties should we expect the sets of possible objects to have? It seems reasonable to expect that they satisfy the following two conditions:
1. The determination condition: The agent's set of possibilities should determine his knowledge. That is, if agent i has the same set of possibilities in (M; w) and in (M 0 ; w 0 ), then (M; w) j = K i ' i (M 0 ; w 0 ) j = K i ' for all formulas '.
2. The union condition: If in some situation (M 1 ; w 1 ) agent i's set of possibilities is P 1 , and in some other situation (M 2 ; w 2 ) agent i's set of possibilities is P 2 , then there should be some situation (M 3 ; w 3 ) where the agent's set of possibilities contains P 1 P 2 . These conditions are certainly quite weak. For example, we might hope for a converse to the rst condition, but this is too much to expect given the lack of expressive power of the modal logics we are considering. For example, consider the single-agent case. If we take the notion of \possibility" here to be a truth assignment, then clearly these two conditions hold. But now suppose we have in nitely many primitive propositions, say p 1 ; p 2 ; : : :. Let W 1 consist of all truth assignments to these propositions, and let W 2 consist of all truth assignments except the one that makes all of the propositions true. It is easy to check (by induction on the structure of ') that for all formulas ' and any truth assignment w 2 W 1 , we have (
Thus, what the agent knows does not determine the set of possibilities in this case. We might also hope to have the second condition hold with equality, but, as we shall see, this too turns out to be too much to expect in general (although it does hold for K n and the introspective logics).
Despite their apparent weakness, the determination and union conditions do serve as useful guidelines for our constructions. Among other things, they are su cient to show that we cannot use truth assignments as our notion of possibility in the multi-agent case, or even in the single-agent case for K, T, and S4, since this would violate the determination condition. For example, the set of truth assignments agent 1 considers possible clearly does not determine whether K 1 K 2 p holds.
Notice that these two conditions may hold for a notion of possibility with respect to one logic and not another. Indeed, we use three di erent notions of possibility in this paper, one for K n , T n , and S4 n , another for K45 n and KD45 n , and yet another for S5 n . While the notions of possibility we use satisfy the union and determination conditions for each of these logics, it is not clear that these are the only choices that could have been made. There may be other notions of possibility that satisfy these conditions that are not isomorphic to the ones we use (for an appropriate notion of isomorphism). While we believe that we have made the \right" choices, there is no theory yet to support this. We defer further discussion of this issue to Section 8. In the next three sections, we de ne these three notions of possibility, and show how they can be used to de ne \only knowing". 4 \Only knowing" for K n , T n , and S4 n In this section, we focus on the logics K n , T n , and S4 n . We start by de ning a notion of possibility for these logics.
Fix a nite set of primitive propositions and agents 1; : : :; n. 5 We de ne a (rooted, directed, and labeled) k-tree (over ) by induction on k: A 0-tree consists of a single node, labeled by a truth assignment to the primitive propositions in . A (k + 1)-tree consists of a root node r labeled by a truth assignment, and for each agent i, a (possibly empty) set of directed edges labeled by i leading from r to roots of distinct k-trees. 6 We say a node w 0 is an i-successor of a node w in a tree if there is an edge labeled i leading from w to w 0 . The depth of a node in a tree is the distance of the node from the root.
An !-tree T ! is a sequence hT 0 ; T 1 ; : : :i, where T k is a k-tree, for k = 0; 1; 2; : : :.
Notice that consecutive elements T k and T k+1 in the sequence may be completely unrelated. Of course, in the !-trees that we shall be interested in, T k will be in a precise sense a projection of T k+1 . However, it turns out to be unnecessary to make this requirement in the general de nition, and it would complicate the de nition unnecessarily.
We remark that !-trees are closely related to the knowledge structures of 4, 5] . In a precise sense, an !-tree can be viewed as a way of representing a knowledge structure. Since the details of the comparison are beyond the scope of this paper, we do not pursue this connection here. They are also much in the spirit of Parikh's normal models 21] . More generally, the use of tree-like structures is quite standard in modal logic. They have played a role in many contexts in modal logic, including complexityrelated arguments 12, 16] and completeness proofs (for example, the subordination frames and tree frames used in completeness proofs in 14] are treelike). Hughes and Cresswell also introduce a technique of amalgamation of structures into what can be viewed as one treelike structure. Amalgamation is used by Jaspars 15] in his analysis of only knowing for S4.
We now show that with each situation we can associate a unique !-tree. We start by going in the other direction. We can associate with each k-tree T (k 6 = !) a Kripke structure M(T) in a straightforward way: the nodes of T are the possible worlds in M(T), the accessibility relation K M (T)   i consists of all pairs (w; w 0 ) such that w 0 is an i-successor of w in T, and M(T) (w) is determined by the truth assignment labeling w.
We de ne the depth of a formula by induction on structure. Intuitively, the depth measures the depth of nesting of the K i operators. Thus, we have depth(p) = 0 for a primitive proposition p; depth(:') = depth('); depth('^ ) = max(depth('); depth( )); depth(K i ') = 1 + depth('). If M and M 0 are (arbitrary) structures, w is a world in M, and w 0 a world in M 0 , then we say that (M; w) and (M 0 ; w 0 ) are equivalent up to depth k, and write (M; w) k (M 0 ; w 0 ), if, whenever ' is a formula with depth(') k, we have (M; w) j = ' i (M 0 ; w 0 ) j = '. We say that (M; w) and (M 0 ; w 0 ) are equivalent, and write (M; w) (M 0 ; w 0 ), if (M; w) k (M 0 ; w 0 ) for all k. Finally, we say that (M; w) and (M 0 ; w 0 ) are i-equivalent, and write (M; w) i (M 0 ; w 0 ), if (M; w) j = K i ' i (M 0 ; w 0 ) j = K i ' for all formulas '. Thus, equivalent situations 5 As we shall see below, the assumption that is nite makes some of our results a little simpler to state, but all our results hold (occasionally with minor modi cations) even if is in nite. 6 Since we are allowing a node to have no successors, any k-tree is also a (k + 1)-tree.
agree on all formulas, while i-equivalent situations agree on all formulas of the form K i '. For convenience, if w 0 is the root of T, we take M(T) j = ' to be an abbreviation for (M(T); w 0 ) j = ', and write (M; w) k M(T) rather than (M; w) k (M(T); w 0 ). Proposition 2 For each situation (M; w) and all k, there is a unique k-tree T M;w;k such that (M; w) k M(T M;w;k ). 7 Proof We construct T M;w;k for each world w 2 W M by induction on k. For each world w, we take T M;w;0 to consist of a single node, labeled by the truth assignment at w. Clearly (M; w) 0 M(T M;w;0 ) for all worlds w 2 W M . Suppose inductively that for each world w 2 W M , we have constructed a tree T M;w;k such that (M; w) k M(T M;w;k ) and shown that it is the unique tree with this property. We construct T M;w;k+1 as follows. We take the root of T M;w;k+1 to be a node labeled by the truth assignment at w. For each world w 0 such that (w; w 0 ) 2 K i , we construct an edge labeled i to the root of T M;w 0 ;k . This may not give us a (k + 1)-tree, since there may be worlds w 0 and w 00 such that both (w; w 0 ) and (w; w 00 ) are in K i , and T M;w 0 ;k and T M;w 00 ;k are identical. We obtain the (k + 1)-tree T M;w;k+1 by deleting duplicate k-xrees. We defer the proof that (M; w) k+1 M(T M;w;k+1 ) and that T M;w;k+1 is the unique tree with this property to the appendix, where the proof of all other technical results can also be found.
Let T M;w be the !-tree hT M;w;0 ; T M;w;1 ; T M;w;2 ; : : :i. As an immediate corollary to Proposition 2, we get that two situations that are associated with the same !-tree are equivalent. Thus, we de ne i's possibilities at (M; w) for S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n g, denoted Poss S i (M; w), to be fT M;w 0 : (w; w 0 ) 2 K i g. The following two propositions say that this notion of possibility does satisfy the two requirements we made. The rst says that the determination condition holds, while the second says that the union condition holds. 8 So far we have de ned S-i-honesty and j i S only for S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n g; as we shall see, the de nitions carry over without change to other modal logics S, once we de ne Poss S i for these logics.
How reasonable are our notions of honesty and j i S ? The following results give us some justi cation for these de nitions. The rst gives us a natural characterization of honesty.
Theorem 6 If S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n g, then the formula is S-i-honest i (a) K i is S-consistent and (b) for all formulas ' 1 ; : : :; ' k , if j = S K i ) (K i ' 1 _ : : : _ K i ' k ), then j = S K i ) K i ' j for some j 2 f1; : : :; kg. This characterization of honesty is similar in spirit to what was called by Lemmon and Scott 18] the rule of disjunction. A modal logic S satis es this rule if j = S K i ' 1 _ : : :K i ' k implies j = S ' j for some j 2 f1; : : :; ng. In 14] it is shown that K, T, and S4 satisfy this rule. The technique used, amalgamation, is the basis for our proof of Theorem 6. We remark that it is quite easy to show that K45, KD45, and S5 do not satisfy this rule (for example, Kp _ K:Kp is valid in each of these logics, even though p is not). Nevertheless, as we shall see, a somewhat analogous property holds for these logics as well.
It follows from Theorem 6 that a typical dishonest formula in the case of T n or S4 n is K i p _ K i q, where p and q are primitive propositions. If is
is valid in T n and S4 n , although neither K i ) K i p nor K i ) K i q is valid. However, the validity of K i ) (K i p_K i q) depends on the fact that K i ) . This is not an axiom of K n . In fact, it can be shown that K i p _ K i q is K n -i-honest. Thus, what is almost the archetypical \dishonest" formula is honest in the context of K n . As the following result shows, this is not an accident.
Theorem 7 All formulas are K n -i-honest. 8 There may be more than one S-i-maximum situation for ; two S-i-maximum situations for may di er in what j 6 = i considers possible. However, if (M;w) and (M 0 ; w 0 ) are two S-i-maximum situations for , then (M;w) j = K i i (M 0 ; w 0 ) j = K i . Thus, our notion of j i S is well de ned.
A set S of formulas is an S-i-stable set if there is some S situation (M; w) such that S = f' : (M; w) j = K i 'g. We say the situation (M; w) corresponds to the stable set S. This de nition is a generalization of the one given by Moore 20] (which in turn is based on Stalnaker's de nition 22]); Moore's notion of stable set corresponds to a K45-stable set in the single-agent case. ( See 7] for some discussion as to why this notion of stable set is appropriate.) Since a stable set describes what can be known in a given situation, we would expect a formula to be honest if it is in a minimum stable set. This is indeed true. Theorem 8 If S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n g, then is S-i-honest i there is an S-i-stable set S containing which is a subset of every S-i-stable set containing . Moreover, if is honest, then j i S i 2 S .
This characterization of honesty is closely related to one given in 11]; we discuss this in more detail in Section 5. We remark that Jaspars 15] essentially uses the characterization provided by this theorem as his de nition of honesty for S4. Our next result gives another characterization of what agent i knows if \all agent i knows is ", for an honest formula . Basically, it shows that all agent i knows are the logical consequences of his knowledge of . Thus, \all agent i knows" is a monotonic notion for the non-introspective logics.
Theorem 9 If S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n g and is S-i-honest, then j i S i j = S K i )
Up to now we have assumed that , the set of primitive propositions, is a nite set, since !-trees were de ned only under this assumption. This turns out not to be a serious restriction. As we hinted before, we could actually deal directly with the case that is in nite, but it su ces to do the following. Given a formula , let be any nite set of primitive propositions that contains all the primitive propositions that appear in . We then de ne to be S-i--honest if is S-i-honest assuming that is the set of primitive propositions are involved. If is in nite, we say that is S-i-honest if is S-i--honest for some containing all the primitive propositions that appear in . By Theorem 6, if is S-i--honest for some choice of , it is Si--honest for all choices of (that contain all the primitive propositions appearing in ). Similarly, we say that j i S if this relation holds for some containing all the primitive propositions that appear in and . By Theorem 9, the choice of does not matter. Thus, all our de nitions and results can easily be extended where is in nite. We continue to assume that is nite, for simplicity, in the next two sections, but using arguments similar to those above, we can easily extend to the case that is in nite. (We remark that while the assumption that is nite does not a ect our de nitions, it does have an impact on complexity; see Section 7 for details.)
This completes our discussion of the non-introspective logics. It is interesting to compare our results here to those proved by Vardi 24] . He de nes a notion of \all agent i knows" for S4 n , using the knowledge-structures approach of 4], and proves Theorem 9 for S4 n in the context of his de nition. Given the close connection between !-trees and knowledge structures, it is not hard to show that our de nition of honesty coincides with his for S4 n . Moreover, !-trees seem to be a better representation for knowledge and possibility as far as proving complexity results. For example, all that Vardi was able to show was that honesty was (nonelementary-time) decidable. In Section 7, we show that in fact deciding whether a formula in S4 n -i-honest is PSPACE-complete. 5 \Only knowing" for K45 n and KD45 n We must take a slightly di erent approach in dealing with the introspective logics. The notion of possibility that we used for the non-introspective logics does not satisfy the union condition in the introspective case. To see this, and the problems it causes, consider the single-agent case. Suppose consists of two primitive propositions, say p and q, and suppose that all the agent knows is p. Surely p should be honest. Indeed, according to the framework of Halpern and Moses 11], there is a maximum situation where p is true where the structure consists of two truth assignments: one where both p and q are true, and the other where p is true and q is false. Call this structure M 1 , and let w be the truth assignment that makes both p and q true. Let M 2 be the structure where the only truth assignment is w. Clearly, the agent knows p in M 2 as well. It is not hard to see that T M1;w and T M2;w are di erent. This follows from Corollary 3 since, for example, (M 1 ; w) j = :K 1 q and (M 2 ; w) j = K 1 q. Now suppose we use Poss K (that is, the notion of possibility Poss S de ned in the last section, with S being K) as our notion of possibility. It is not hard to show that there is no S situation (M 3 ; w 0 ) for S 2 fK45; KD45; S5g such that Poss K 1 (M 3 ; w 0 ) Poss K 1 (M 1 ; w) Poss K 1 (M 2 ; w).
For suppose there were. What truth assignments does the agent consider possible at w 0 ? If it is only the one where both p and q are true, then it is easy to see that Poss K 1 (M 1 ; w) is not contained in Poss K 1 (M 3 ; w 0 ). If it is anything else, then it is easy to see that Poss K 1 (M 1 ; w) is not contained in Poss K 1 (M 3 ; w 0 ). The problem is introspection: the agent knows what truth assignments he considers possible, and this information is contained in the set of possibilities. We need to factor out this introspection somehow. In the single-agent case considered by Halpern and Moses 11], this was done by considering only truth assignments, not trees. We need an analogue for the multi-agent case.
We de ne an i-objective k-tree to be a k-tree whose root has no i-successors. We de ne an i-objective !-tree to be an !-tree all of whose components are i-objective. Given a k-tree T, let T i be the result of removing all the i-successors of the root of T (and all the nodes reachable from these i-successors). Given an !-tree T = The following two propositions say that this notion of possibility satis es the union and determination condition in the case of K45 n and KD45 n . As we shall see in the next section, it does not satisfy the union requirement for S5 n (which is why we shall use a slightly di erent notion of possibility for S5 n ). Notice that for S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n g, Poss S i (M 3 ; w 3 ) is actually equal to Poss S i (M 1 ; w 1 ) Poss S i (M 2 ; w 2 ), not just a superset.
Our notion of S-i-honesty and j i S makes perfect sense for S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n g. Of course, we now use i-objective trees as our notion of possibility. Since i-objective trees are truth assignments in the single-agent case, it is easy to see that these de nitions generalize those for the single-agent case given in 11].
We now want to characterize honesty and \all agent i knows" for K45 n and KD45 n . There are some signi cant di erences from the non-introspective case. For example, if S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n g, then, as expected, the primitive proposition p is S-1-honest. However, due to negative introspection, :K 1 q ) K 1 :K 1 q is S-valid, so we have j = S K 1 p ) (K 1 q _ K 1 :K 1 q). Moreover, we have neither j = S K 1 p ) K 1 q nor j = S K 1 p ) K 1 :K 1 q. Thus, the analogue to Theorem 6 does not hold.
As the following result shows, the analogue of Theorem 6 holds for K45 n and KD45 n provided we stick to i-objective formulas.
Theorem 15 For S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n g, the formula is S-i-honest i (a) K i is S-consistent and (b) for all i-objective formulas ' 1 ; : : :; ' k , if j = S K i ) (K i ' 1 _ : : : _ K i ' k ) then j = S K i ) K i ' j for some j 2 f1; : : :; kg.
We remark that part (a) is vacuous in the case of K45 n , since any formula of the form K i must be K45 n -consistent.
This result does not hold for S5 n , at least not if we want true to be S5 n -1-honest.
For notice that j = S5n K 1 true ) (K 1 q _ K 1 K 2 :K 2 K 1 q). (This follows from the fact that j = S5 n :K 1 q ) K 1 K 2 :K 2 K 1 q.) However, it is easy to see that 6 j = S5 n K 1 true ) K 1 q and 6 j = S5 n K 1 true )
Theorem 15 is a direct extension of a result in 11] for the single-agent case. Two other characterizations of honesty and \all I know" are given by Halpern and Moses, that can be viewed as analogues to Theorems 8 and 9. As we now show, they also extend to K45 n and KD45 n , but not S5 n .
One of these characterizations is in terms of stable sets. The direct analogue of Theorem 8 does not hold for the introspective logics. In fact, as was already shown by Halpern and Moses 11] for the single-agent case, any two consistent stable sets are incomparable with respect to set inclusion. Again, the problem is due to introspection. Theorem 16 For S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n g, a formula is S-i-honest i there is an S-istable set S containing such that for all S-i-stable sets S containing , we have ker i (S ) ker i (S). Moreover, if is S-i-honest, then j i S i 2 S .
Theorem 16 does not hold for S5 n if we want true to be S5 n -1-honest. Suppose that S is an S5 n -1-stable set that does not include q. Thus, it must include :K 1 q. Since j = S5n K 1 :K 1 q ) K 1 K 2 :K 2 K 1 q, the set S must also contain the objective formula K 2 :K 2 K 1 q. But there is another S5 n -1-stable set that contains the formula K 1 q and does not contain K 2 :K 2 K 1 q. This shows that no S5 n -1-stable set that does not contain q can have a minimum 1-kernel among all stable sets. But surely an S5 n -1-stable set containing q cannot have a minimum S5 n -1-kernel among S5 n -1-stable sets, since there is an S5 n -1-stable set not containing q. It follows that there is no S5 n -1-stable set with a minimum1-kernel, so true does not satisfy the characterization above for honesty in the case of S5 n . In fact, we can extend this example to show for no formula is there an S5 n -i-stable set containing whose i-kernel is a minimum; we omit details here.
Finally, let us consider the analogue to Theorem 9. For S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n g, it is not hard to show that if and are propositional formulas, then we have j i S i j = S K i ) K i . This is no longer true if or involve modal operators. For example, we have pj 1 S :K 1 q even though 6 j = S K 1 p ) K 1 :K 1 q. This seems reasonable: If all agent 1 knows is p, then agent 1 does not know q and (by introspection) knows that he does not know this. 9 On the other hand, if agent i learns q, then he will know q, and (by introspection) knows he knows it; that is, p^qj 1 S K 1 q. This shows 9 Note that there is an implicit assumption here that the agent is aware of all the primitive that, in contrast to the non-introspective case, inference from \all agent i knows" is nonmonotonic for S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n g.
As shown by Halpern and Moses 11], there is an elegant algorithmic characterization of \all agent i knows" in the single-agent case. Roughly speaking, the idea is as follows. To see if j 1 , if is a propositional formula, we check if j = S K 1 ) K 1 .
If is not a propositional formula, then there must be some subformula of of the form K 1 , where is a propositional formula. Let 0 be the subformula that results if we replace K 1 by true if j = S K 1 ) K 1 , and by false otherwise. We now apply the same procedure to 0 . Ultimately, we end up with a propositional formula, say 00 . We then have j i j = S K 1 ) K 1 00 .
We extend this idea to the multi-agent case here. The analogue of formulas like K 1 where is a propositional formula now becomes what we call a top-level isubformula. A top-level i-subformula of a formula is a subformula of of the form K i ' which is not in the scope of a modal operator K j , j 6 = i, such that ' is i-objective. Thus, if is K i K i p _ K i K j K i q, its top-level i-subformulas are K i p and K i K j K i q.
We can now generalize the construction as follows:
De nition 17 Given Finally, we de ne D i S ( ) to consist of all those formulas such that the last formula in the sequence A i S ( ; ) is true. 10 Example 18 Suppose is the formula K i K i p_K i K j K i q. Then, as we observed, K i p and K i K j K i q are the top-level i-subformulas of K i ; it is easy to see that neither is implied by K i . Thus, A i K45n ( ; ) is the sequence hK i (
As the following result shows, D i S ( ) can be viewed as the set of formulas that agent i knows, given that agent i knows only (and reasons using modal logic S). Theorem 19 For S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n g, the formula is S-i-honest i K i is Sconsistent and 2 D i S ( ). If is S-i-honest, then j i S i 2 D i S ( ).
propositions, even if he does not know them. If the agent is not even aware of the existence of q, then he will not even know that he does not know q. This intuition is formalized in the logic of general awareness of 3]. 10 We remark that this construction of D i S ( ) is not identical to that given in 11] if we consider the single-agent case. We could have used a direct extension of the algorithm given in 11], but the variant we use here turns out to be easier to work with in the multi-agent case. 6 \Only knowing" for S5 n As we have seen, the approach to dealing with honesty taken for K45 n and KD45 n does not work for S5 n . As we show in this section, a small change in the notion of possibility solves the problem. First, let us examine why the notion of \possibility" de ned for KD45 n and K45 n is inappropriate for S5 n . must be the case that 1 considers it possible that 2 knows that 1 knows p; i.e., 1 must consider it possible that K 2 K 1 p holds. But, in S5 n , K 2 K 1 p implies K 1 p, so agent 1 must consider it possible that K 1 p holds. From the negative introspection property, it then follows that 1 must know p. This means that in no situation where 1 considers T 1 M1;w1 possible can 1 have T 1 M2;w2 among his set of possibilities, at least, under this notion of \possibility". This is clearly incompatible with the union property.
To solve this problem, we need to somehow factor out (what the agent considers possible in) the actual situation when we are constructing an agent's possibilities. We now present one way of doing so. Roughly speaking, we construct a tree with nodes labeled that represent the actual world (i.e., the root of the tree). Formally, we de ne k--trees by induction on k: a 0--tree is a 0-tree, and a (k + 1)--tree consists of a root r labeled by a truth assignment, and for each agent, a (possibly empty) set of directed edges labeled by i leading from r to roots of distinct k--trees or to a special node labeled . Intuitively, a node labeled represents the actual situation and what is considered possible at the actual situation. We can think of an edge to a node labeled as really being a backedge to the root (i.e., the \actual situation"). We de ne !--trees and i-objective -trees in the obvious way; we omit the formal details here. Given a -tree T, we de ne the corresponding Kripke structure, which we continue to denote M(T), just as we did for ordinary trees, except that, as suggested by the intuition above, there are now no nodes in M(T) corresponding to the nodes in T labeled by , and edges in T labeled by i to a node labeled are replaced in M(T) by edges to the root of T. (Note that if there are no nodes labeled in T, so that T is actually an ordinary tree, then the old de nition of M(T) agrees with this one, justifying our abuse of notation.)
As we are about to show, there is no di culty proving an analogue to Proposition 2 that allows us to associate with each situation a unique -tree. In what sense does the -tree help us factor out what the agent considers possible at the actual world? To make sense of this, it is helpful to extend the language with a family of modal operators Q i , i = 1; : : :; n, where is an i-subjective formula, that is, a Boolean combination of formulas of the form K i . 11 Intuitively, Q i ' holds in the situation (M; w) if ' holds no matter how we modify i's accessibility relation at w, provided we do so in a way that holds. Thus, the Q De ne a Q i -formula to be one of the form Q i ', where ' 2 L n . For convenience, we de ne depth(Q i ') = depth('). Q i -formulas are the analogue for S5 n of i-objective formulas in the case of K45 n and KD45 n . For example, it is not hard to show that Q i ' ' is valid in all K45 n or KD45 n structures if ' is i-objective and is satis able. This is not true for S5 n . For example, Q K1true 1 K 2 K 1 p is not equivalent to K 2 K 1 p: We can easily construct a situation in which K 2 K 1 p is true that can be embedded in a situation where K 1 p, and hence also K 2 K 1 p, is false. We write (M; Again, our de nitions of S-i-honesty and j i S now carry over for S = S5 n . We remark that we restrict the j i S5n relation to formulas in L n here to simplify the comparison to previous sections. There is no di culty extending it to L Q n though.
Again, it is easy to see that these de nitions generalize those for the single-agent case given in 11].
We now want to characterize honesty and \all agent i knows" for S5 n . The theorems have very much the same avor as the corresponding results for K45 n and KD45 n , so we just state them here without much comment.
Theorem 24 The formula is S5 n -i-honest i (a) K i is S5 n -consistent and (b) for all Q i -formulas ' 1 ; : : :; ' k , if j = S5n K i ) (K i ' 1 _: : :_K i ' k ) then j = S5n K i ) K i ' j for some j 2 f1; : : :; kg.
Notice that although we have j = S5n K 1 true ) ( If is S5 n -i-honest, then j i S5n i 2 D i Q ( ). We close this section by brie y comparing our approach to de ning \all I know" for S5 n to two others that have appeared in the literature. Fagin, Halpern, and Vardi 4] de ne a notion of i-no-information extension that can also be viewed as characterizing a notion of \all agent i knows" in the context of S5 n . However, it is de ned only for a limited set of formulas. 12 It can be shown that these formulas are always S5 n -i-honest in our sense, and, if is one of these formulas, we have j i S5n i is true in the i-no-information extension of . The fact that these two independently motivated de nitions coincide (at least, in the cases where the i-no-information extension is de ned) provides further evidence for the reasonableness of our de nitions. Parikh 21] de nes a notion of \all that is known" for S5 n much in the spirit of the de nitions given here. Among other things, he also starts with k-trees (he calls them normal models), although he does not use i-objective trees. However, rather than focusing on all that some xed agent i knows as we have done, Parikh treats all agents on an equal footing. This leads to some technical di erences between the approaches. His approach also does not lend itself well to proving complexity results. He was also able to obtain only nonelementary-time algorithms for deciding whether a formula was honest in his sense. As we shall see in the next section, we can do much better.
Complexity issues
We now characterize the complexity of computing honesty and \all i knows".
Theorem 27 For S 2 fT n ; S4 n : n 1g fK45 n ; KD45 n ; S5 n : n 2g, the problem of computing whether is S-i-honest is PSPACE-complete.
Of course, the problem of computing whether is K n -i-honest is trivial: the answer is always \Yes".
Theorem 28 For S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n : n 1g fK45 n ; KD45 n ; S5 n : n 2g, if is S-i-honest, then the problem of deciding if j i S is PSPACE-complete. The requirement that n 2 for the introspective logics is necessary. While PSPACE is, of course, still an upper bound if n = 1, we can do better. How much better we can do depends on whether (the set of primitive propositions) is nite or in nite. This issue was not relevant in the context of Theorems 27 and 28; as our proof shows, the PSPACE result holds as long as has even a single primitive proposition. It does make a di erence, however, in the case of K45, KD45, and S5. In these cases, if is nite, the problems we are interested in are decidable in polynomial time. On the other hand, if is in nite, then the relevant complexity class turns out to be p;log(n) 2 . 13 The complexity class p 2 consists of all languages L such that membership in L can be decided by a Turing machine that runs in polynomial time, but is allowed to make queries to an NP oracle. The complexity class p;log(n) 2 consists of those languages in p 2 such that on an input of size n, the NP oracle is queried at most log(n) times. It is easy to see that p;log(n) 2 PSPACE. It is conjectured that the containment is strict, but this has not yet been proved. Using recent results of Gottlob 6] , we can show 13 The situation here is analogous to the satis ability problem for these logics. As shown in 9], in the case of Kn, Tn, and S4n, the satis ability problem is PSPACE complete even if n = 1 and contains only one primitive proposition. Similarly, we get PSPACE completeness for the satisability problem for K45n, KD45n, and S5n as long as n 2, even if contains only one primitive propositions. However, for K45, KD45, and S5 (where there is only one agent), the satis ability problem is NP-complete if contains in nitely many primitive propositions, and in polynomial time if contains a nite number of primitive propositions.
Theorem 29 Suppose S 2 fKD45; K45; S5g. If (the set of primitive propositions) is nite, then the problem of deciding whether is S-1-honest and the problem of deciding whether j 1 S for an S-1-honest are both decidable in polynomial time.
If is in nite, these problems are both p;log(n) 2 -complete.
Discussion
We have extended the HM notion of only knowing to (the multi-agent case of) a number of modal logics. The key tool was an appropriate canonical representation of the possibilities of the agents. Such a canonical representation should also be useful in other applications where we need to characterize the set of possibilities of an agent, such as in extending Levesque's notion of only knowing to multiple agents. (See 8] for a discussion of how this can be done, and 17] for an alternative approach; a synthesis can be found in 10].) Despite its attractive properties, there is still an element of ad hockery to our approach. 14 For example, for the non-introspective logics, we used !-trees to de ne the notion of what agent i considers possible, for K45 n and KD45 n , we used i-objective !-trees, and for S5 n , we used i-objective !--trees. In general, it is clear that the notion of \all I know" is a function of the notion of possibility. We could, for example, de ne a notion of \all I know" for K45 n and KD45 n using !-trees. The reason we did not, as we argued above, is that this de nition would result in a rather strange notion of \all I know", with quite counterintuitive properties. This observation, of course, raises a number of questions.
Can we get some kind of a correspondence between properties of \all I know" and properties of the notion of possibility? We conjecture that conditions like the union condition and the determination condition will be necessary to get a reasonable notion of \all I know". We required that our notion of possibility satisfy the union condition and the determination condition. Are these conditions su cient to determine the notion of \possibility" uniquely for a given logic? If not, can we nd additional reasonable conditions that do determine it uniquely? Do the results we have proved for the logics we have considered hold for any notion of possibility that satis es the union condition and determination condition? Although the notion of possibility used for S5 n seems rather complicated, it may well be that it (or something like it) is forced by some natural requirements. It would be comforting to have a framework in which this can be made precise.
The notion of \possibility" arises in a number of contexts. For example, it can also be used to extend Levesque's notion of \only knowing" to many agents 8, 10]. For another example, consider the approaches to modal logics of normality or plausibility such as that of Boutilier 1] , which have thus far only been de ned in the single-agent case. Boutilier's semantics involves placing an ordering on (all) worlds. If we try to extend his intuitions to the multi-agent case, we may well need to place an ordering on \possibilities". Thus, it would be useful to have a general theory of what counts as a \possibility". As shown in 10], the situation is in fact even more complicated. For the converse, suppose that (M; w) j = :K i . Thus, for some w 0 with (w; w 0 ) 2 K i , we have (M; w 0 ) j = : . By construction, there must be an edge labeled i in T M;w;k+1 from w to a node which is the root of T M;w 0 ;k . Using the induction hypothesis just as in the previous paragraph, we get that M(T M;w 0 ;k ) j = : , and so M(T M;w;k+1 ) j = :K i . This completes the inductive proof.
For uniqueness, it su ces to show that if all k 0 , if T and T 0 are distinct k 0 -trees, then M(T)6 k 0 M(T 0 ). We prove this result by induction on k 0 . If k 0 = 0, this is immediate from the fact that if T and T 0 are distinct 0-trees, then the truth assignments labeling the roots of T and T 0 must be di erent. If k 0 > 0 and T and T 0 are distinct m-trees, with roots w and w 0 respectively. Either the truth assignments labelling w and w 0 must be di erent, or for some agent i, the set of subtrees of T rooted at the i-successors of w must be di erent from the set of subtrees of T 0 rooted at the i-successors of w 0 . In the former case, the result is immediate. In the latter case, we can assume without loss of generality that there is some i-successor v of w such that the subtree of T rooted at v is di erent from all the subtrees rooted at i-successors of w 0 . Let 3 ) is an amalgamation of (M 1 ; w 1 ) and (M 2 ; w 2 ). We leave it to the reader to check that with these de nitions, (M 3 ; w 3 ) is an S situation (our requirement that (w 3 ; w 3 ) 2 K j was precisely to take care of the possibility that S is T or S4) and that Poss S i (M 3 ; w 3 ) Poss S i (M 1 ; w 1 ) Poss S i (M 2 ; w 2 ).
Notice that if S is T n or S4 n , then the assumption that (w 3 ; w 3 ) 2 K i is necessary (otherwise M 3 would not be an S-structure). This means that T (M3;w3) 2 Poss S i (M 3 ; w 3 ), which in turn means that Poss S i (M 3 ; w 3 ) may be a strict superset of Poss S i (M 1 ; w 1 ) Poss S i (M 2 ; w 2 ). As we showed in the main text, this is unavoidable.
On the other hand, if S = K n , we do not need the assumption that (w 3 ; w 3 ) 2 K i .
So, for K n , we can assume that Poss S i (M 3 ; w 3 ) = Poss S i (M 1 ; w 1 ) Poss S 1 (M 2 ; w 2 ). Theorem 6: If S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n g, then the formula is S-i-honest i (a) K i is S-consistent and (b) for all formulas ' 1 ; : : :; ' k , if j = S K i ) (K i ' 1 _ : : : _ K i ' k ), then j = S K i ) K i ' j for some j 2 f1; : : :; kg.
Proof Let S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n g. For the \only if" direction, suppose that is S-ihonest. Thus, there is an S situation (M; w) such that (M; w) j = K i , and for all S situations (M 0 ; w 0 ), if (M 0 ; w 0 ) j = K i , then Poss S i (M 0 ; w 0 ) Poss S i (M; w). Clearly K i must be S-consistent. Now suppose that j = S K i ) (K i ' 1 _ : : : _ K i ' k ). To obtain a contradiction, suppose K i ^:K i ' j is S-consistent for j = 1; : : :; k. This means that there is some S situation (M j ; w j ) such that (M j ; w j ) j = K i and a world w Thus, there is an S situation (M ; w ) such that (M ; w ) j = K i ^V 2F :K i .
We now construct an S-i-maximum situation (M max ; w ) for K i as follows: Intuitively, we want to start with all situations satisfying K i and \glue" them together appropriately, as was done in the proof of Proposition 5. The problem is that we cannot talk about the \set" of situations satisfying K i ; it is not a set (it is too large). In fact, for our purposes, it would su ce to consider only situations with countably many worlds, but rather than proving this formally, we take N to be a set of situa- From the proof of Theorem 6, we get the following corollary, which will be useful in our later complexity results.
Corollary 30 If S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n g, then the formula is S-i-honest i (a) K i is S-consistent and (b 0 ) for all formulas ' 1 ; : : :; ' k such that K i ' j is a subformula of , for j = 1; : : :; k, if j = S K i ) (K i ' 1 _ : : : _ K i ' k ), then j = S K i ) K i ' j for some j 2 f1; : : :; kg. Proof The \only if" direction follows immediately from Theorem 6. For the \if" direction, observe that in the proof that is honest, we did not use the full strength of clause (b) in the statement of Theorem 6; rather it su ced to consider subformulas of of the form K i '. From Theorem 6, it follows that is K n -honest. Theorem 8: If S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n g, then is S-i-honest i there is an S-i-stable set S containing which is a subset of every S-i-stable set containing . Moreover, if is honest, then j i S i 2 S . Proof Suppose is S-i-honest. Then, by de nition, there is an S-i-maximum situation for , say (M ; w ). Let S = f' : (M ; w ) j = K i 'g. Clearly S is an S-i-stable set containing . Let S be any other S-i-stable set containing . For the converse, suppose that there is an S-i-stable set S containing which is a subset of every S-i-stable set containing . Clearly K i is S-consistent, since it is satis ed in every S situation corresponding to S . We want to show that is S-ihonest. Suppose that j = S K i ) (K i ' 1 _: : :_K i ' k ). It follows that every S-i-stable set containing must contain one of ' 1 ; : : :; ' k . In particular, this is true of S . So we can suppose without loss of generality that ' 1 2 S . By de nition of S , this means that ' 1 is in every S-i-stable set containing . We must have j = S K i ) K i ' 1 , for if K i ^:K 1 ' 1 were S-consistent, there would be an S situation (M; w) such that (M; w) j = K i ^:K i ' 1 . But then S = f : (M; w) j = K i g is an S-i-stable set containing and not ' 1 , a contradiction. It now follows from Theorem 6 that is honest.
Theorem 9: If S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n g and is S-i-honest, then j i S i j = S K i ) Proof Suppose the hypotheses of the proposition hold and the conclusion does not. Then, without loss of generality, there exists a formula ' such that (M; w) j = K i ' and (M 0 ; w 0 ) j = :K i '. Without loss of generality, we can assume that ' is the formula of minimum depth with this property, so that for all formulas with depth( ) < depth('), we have (M; w) j = K i i (M 0 ; w 0 ) j = K i . Using the following equivalences, it is not hard to show that ' must be an i-objective formula: Both have a j-successor of the root corresponding to w 0 , but the i-successors of this j-successor must be di erent in the two trees. It follows that Poss S i (M 3 ; w 3 ) will be incomparable to Poss S i (M 1 ; w 1 ), rather than being a superset of it.
We can get around this problem by assuming that (M 1 ; w 1 ) and (M 2 ; w 2 ) are both i-special. (If not, then by Lemma 31, we can nd i-special situations (M 0 j ; w 0 j ) such that (M 0 j ; w 0 j ) (M j ; w j ), for j = 1; 2. Since equivalent situations have the same set of possibilities, we can use these instead.) As in Proposition 5, we now de ne (M 3 ; w 3 ) so that W M3 = W M1 W M2 fw 3 g and K M3 j = K M1 j K M2 j for j 6 = i. We de ne
We leave it to the reader to check that with this de nition, (M 3 ; w 3 ) is an S-situation Theorem 15: For S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n g, the formula is S-i-honest i (a) K i is S-consistent and (b) for all i-objective formulas ' 1 ; : : :; ' k , if j = S K i ) (K i ' 1 _ : : : _ K i ' k ) then j = S K i ) K i ' j for some j 2 f1; : : :; kg.
Proof The proof follows lines similarto those of Theorem 6. Suppose S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n g. We now want to show (M max ; w ) j = K i . Again, we do this by proving that if (M; w) is a situation in N and w 0 is a world in W M , then (M; w 0 ) j = i (M max ; w 0 ) j = for every subformula of K i . The details are much as in the proof of Theorem 6, so are omitted here. It follows that (M max ; w ) is an S-i-maximum situation for K i .
As a corollary to the proof of Theorem 15, we get the following analogue to Corollary 30, whose proof is essentially identical to that of Corollary 30.
Corollary 32 If S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n g, then the formula is S-i-honest i (a) K i is S-consistent and (b 0 ) for all formulas ' 1 ; : : :; ' k in B i S ( ; ), if j = S K i ) (K i ' 1 _ : : : _ K i ' k ), then j = S K i ) K i ' j for some j 2 f1; : : :; kg.
Theorem 16: For S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n g, a formula is S-i-honest i there is an S-i-stable set S containing such that for all S-i-stable sets S containing we have ker i (S ) ker i (S). Moreover, if is S-i-honest, then j i S i 2 S . Proof The proof follows almost the same lines as that of Theorem 8. Suppose is Si-honest. Then, by de nition, there is an S-i-maximum situation for , say (M ; w ). Let S = f' : (M ; w ) j = K i 'g. Clearly S is an S-i-stable set containing . Let S be any other S-i-stable set containing . Proof The inductive construction proceeds much like that in Proposition 2. The only di erence is that we give the world w special treatment in our construction.
Given a structure M and worlds w; w 0 2 W M , we construct a -tree that we call For the converse, suppose that there is an S5 n -i-Q-stable set S containing such that ker Q i (S ) ker Q i (S) for every other S5 n -i-stable set containing . We want to show that is S5 n -i-honest. Suppose that j = S5n K i ) ( 
D Proofs for Section 7
Theorem 27: For S 2 fT n ; S4 n : n 1g fK45 n ; KD45 n ; S5 n : n 2g, the problem of computing whether is S-i-honest is PSPACE-complete.
Proof For S 2 fT n ; S4 n : n 1g, the upper bound is almost immediate from If S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n : n 2g, then the upper bound follows using similar reasoning from Corollary 32 and the fact that the validity problem for K45 n and KD45 n is in PSPACE 12] . 16 Finally, for the case of S5 n , we rst remark that the techniques of 12] can be used to show that validity in S5 n situations for the language L Q can be determined in PSPACE. Thus, the tests required to check whether 2 D i Q ( ) can all be carried out in PSPACE. The upper bound now follows from Theorem 26.
For the lower bound in the case that S is T n or S4 n , let be an arbitrary formula and let q be a primitive proposition that does not appear in . We claim that is S-valid i = K 1 q _ K 1 (q ) ) is S-1-honest. Clearly, if is S-valid, then is equivalent to true, and so is honest. For the converse, suppose is not S-valid. Since K 1 ) is S-valid, by Theorem 6, it su ces to show that neither K 1 ) K 1 q nor K 1 ) K 1 (q ) ) is S-valid. Since is not S-valid, there must be some S situation (M; w) such that (M; w) j = : . Since q does not appear in , there are S-structures M 1 and M 2 that are identical to M except that in M 1 , q is true at all the worlds, while in M 2 , :q is true at all worlds. Clearly (M 1 ; w) j = K 1 ^:K 1 (q ) ) while (M 2 ; w) j = K 1 ^:K 1 q. This proves that is not honest. Since deciding validity in T n or S4 n is PSPACE-hard for n 1 as long as there is at least one primitive proposition in 9], 17 it follows that deciding honesty is PSPACE hard if there are at least two primitive propositions in the language (since we have assumed that q does not appear in ). We can improve this slightly. Using the techniques of 9], we can show that the PSPACE lower bound holds even if j j = 1. The idea is that, with only one primitive proposition and the modal operator K 1 , we can write an in nite family of formulas that have all the properties that we really need of primitive propositions. Thus we can simulate the argument above using only one primitive proposition. We refer the reader to 9] for details.
For the lower bound in the case that S is K45 n , KD45 n , or S5 n , let be an arbitrary formula and let p be an arbitrary primitive proposition (which may appear in ). We claim that truej 1 S i = K 1 p _ K 1 :p _ K 1 is S-1-honest. If truej 1 S , then K 1 is true in an S-1-maximum situation for true, say (M; w). Clearly we also have (M; w) j = K 1 . Thus, there is an S-1-maximum situation for K 1 , namely (M; w), and hence is S-1-honest. Conversely, suppose that is S-1-honest. Then it has a maximum S-1 situation, say (M; w). Consider any i-objective tree (or, in the case of S5 n , i-objective -tree) T. Either p or :p must be true at the root of T. If it is p, then clearly T is in Poss S 1 (M 0 ; w 0 ) for some S situation (M 0 ; w 0 ) that satis es K 1 p. Similarly, if the root satis es :p, then T is in Poss S 1 (M 0 ; w 0 ) for some S situation (M 0 ; w 0 ) that satis es :p. In either case, we must have T 2 Poss S 1 (M; w). It follows that (M; w) is a maximum S-1 situation for true. Moreover, we have (M; w) j = :K 1 p^:K 1 :p. Since (M; w) j = K 1 , we must have (M; w) j = K 1 , so truej 1 S . This completes the proof of the claim.
Thus, for S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n ; S5 n g, we have shown that checking honesty is as hard as checking whether truej 1 S . For the case of S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n : n 2g, it is easy to see that if ' is a 1-objective formula, then truej 1 S ' i ' is valid. Thus, to get the PSPACE lower bound, it su ces to show that it is PSPACE hard to decide the validity of 1-objective formulas in the case of K45 n and KD45 n . This follows from the lower bound proof given in 9]. There (just as in 12]) it is shown that we can e ectively translate a QBF (Quanti ed Boolean Formula) A to a modal formula ' A involving only the modal operators K 1 and K 2 so that so that A is true i ' A is S-satis able, for S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n ; S5 n g. The PSPACE lower bound for satis ability for K45 n and KD45 n , n 2, then follows from the PSPACE lower bound for QBF 23] . The formula ' A is in fact 1-objective and can be assumed to mention only one primitive proposition. Thus, deciding satis ability and validity for 1-objective formulas is PSPACE-hard. It follows that deciding whether a formula is S-1-honest is PSPACE-hard, even if consists of a single primitive proposition, for S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n g.
For S5 n , in the case that n 3, we can get a lower bound in a similar way: From Theorem 26, it follows that if ' is a formula that only involves the modal operators K 2 and K 3 , then ' is S5 2 -valid i truej 1 S5n '. The PSPACE lower bound now follows from the PSPACE lower bound for S5 2 . To get the PSPACE lower bound in the case that n = 2, we need to look even more closely at the PSPACE lower bound proof in 9]. The formulas ' A that arise in the proof are easily seen to have the following property: either :' A is valid (if the QBF A is false), and hence so is K 2 K 1 :', or ' A is satis able and it is not the case that truej 1 S5n K 2 K 1 :' A . Thus, A is false i Theorem 28: For S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n : n 1g fK45 n ; KD45 n ; S5 n : n 2g, if is S-i-honest, then the problem of deciding if j i S is PSPACE-complete.
Proof For S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n : n 1g, the upper bound follows from Theorem 9 and the fact that checking validity for S is in PSPACE 12] . For the lower bound, observe that is S-valid i K 1 is valid, and thus, by Theorem 9, is valid i truej 1 S . The result now follows from the PSPACE lower bound for checking validity for S, which holds even if consists of a single proposition 9, 12].
For S 2 fK45 n ; KD45 n ; S5 n : n 2g, the upper bound follows from Theorems 19 and 26. The lower bound follows from the observation made in the proof of Theorem 27 that proving whether truej i S is already PSPACE hard.
Theorem 29: Suppose S 2 fKD45; K45; S5g. If (the set of primitive propositions) is nite, then the problem of deciding whether is S-1-honest and the problem of deciding whether j 1 S for an S-1-honest are both decidable in polynomial time.
Proof Since, as we have observed, the notions of honesty and j i S coincide for K45, KD45, and S5 (except that false is K45-honest and not KD45-or S5-honest), it su ces to focus on KD45.
Clearly if is nite, there are 2 j j truth assignment to the propositions in . Thus, there are no more than 2 2 j j 2 j j KD45 situations. To decide if is KD45-1-honest, we must see if there is a maximum situation satisfying K . This can be done by exhaustively checking all situations, in time linear in j j, the length of . (Of course, the constant here will be some multiple of 2 2 j j , but this is independent of j j.) Similar Gottlob showed that the validity problem for Carnap's logic is p;log(n) 2 -complete. Gottlob's argument in fact shows that if we start with any base logic whose satis ability problem is NP-complete and extend it with a 2 operator that denotes validity as above, then the validity problem of the resulting logic p;log(n) 2 -complete. Since the satis ability problem for KD45 is also NP-complete, Gottlob's argument shows that the validity problem for the full logic with both K and 2 operators is p;log(n) 2 -complete. For the lower bound, given a formula ' in Carnap's logic, let ' be the result of replacing all 2 operators in ' by K 1 . Let W consist of all truth assignments and let w 2 W . An easy induction on the structure of ' that w j = ' i (W ; w) j = '. It follows that truej 1 KD45 ' i ' is valid. This shows that the problem of deciding if j 1 KD45 is p;log(n) 2 hard. Let q be a primitive proposition that does not appear in '. It is easy to see that ' is valid in Carnap's logic i = K 1 ' _ K 1 q _ K 1 :q is KD45-1-honest. For if ' is valid in Carnap's logic, then there is an KD45-1-maximum situation satisfying K 1 (namely, the situation (W ; w), where W consisting of all truth assignments and w 2 W ). Conversely, suppose ' is not valid in Carnap's structure. Clearly every truth assignment satisfying q is in some situation satisfying K 1 q (and thus K 1 ); similarly every truth assignment satisfying :q is in some situation satisfying K 1 :q. Thus, if K 1 were KD45-1-honest, then the only KD45-1-maximum structure satisfying it would be W . But, clearly W j = :K 1 q^:K 1 :q. Since ' is not valid in Carnap's logic, it also follows from our earlier argument that there is some truth assignment w 2 W such that (W ; w) j = :' . Hence, (W ; w) j = :K 1 ' . It follows that (W ; w) j = :K 1 , so is not KD45-1-honest. The p;log(n) 2 lower bound on checking whether a formula is KD45-1-honest now follows from Gottlob's results.
For the upper bounds, we use the ideas of De nition 17 and Theorem 19. We now de ne an extended objective formula to be a Boolean combination of propositional formulas and formulas of the form 2'. A top-level subformula of a formula is a subformula of the form K i ' such that ' is an extended objective formula. Given 
